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 For this is the journey that men [and women] make:
 
to find themselves.
 
If they fail in this,
 
it doesn't matter much what else they find.
 
(Michener, The Fires of Spring) RIGHT-WING YOUTH VIOLENCE IN REUNITED GERMANY 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a cultural study of the phenomenon of youth violence. "Cultural 
study" is defined as an exploratory research endeavor regarding the expressive and 
communicative media which serve as vehicles of social change. The focus of this cultural 
study centers upon the historical and sociocultural contexts of youth violence in pre- and 
past-unification Germany. 
The rate of violence among youth has increased in Europe's cities and the rate of 
racist violence has reached alarming levels. By the early 1990's, many groups of people 
had faced racist violence and harassment as a threatening part of their everyday lives. 
This situation was accompanied by political, economic, social and demographic changes 
which took place across Europe, and to an even larger extent, in Eastern Europe. The 
main focus of this thesis will be upon the emergence of violent right-wing groups which 
have emerged in the German youth scene since Germany's reunification in 1990. 
Over the last seven years, the rate of violent activities committed by young right-
wing radicals has increased. The targets of this violence are dark-skinned Germans, dark-
skinned foreigners, Turks, immigrants and their descendants, asylum-seekers, refugees, 
members of minority groups on the basis of skin color, religion, ethnic, cultural or 
national origin, the elderly, the homeless and the disabled. Three particular incidents of 
mass violence against foreigners have been regarded as the most obnoxious examples committed by racists and neo-Nazis: The first was at Hoyerswerda, East Germany, during 
late September, 1991; the second was at Rostock, East Germany, during late August, 
1992; and the third was at Mb lln, in Schleswig-Holstein, a few miles west of the former 
East German border, on 23 November, 1992. In Hoyerswerda, Skinheads attacked 
Vietnamese former factory workers and asylum-seekers; a bloody battle ensued between 
Skinheads and left-wing anarchist radicals, with the police trying to separate them. Local 
people gathered to watch, and the police and media reporters argued that most of them 
were sympathetic to the Skinheads. In Rostock, gangs of aggressive youth  two hundred 
to three hundred of them -- set a building of Vietnamese guest-workers on fire. The 
Vietnamese were evacuated to safety, but the following day, a battle between the police 
and the rioters raged for hours. In Minn, two young Skinheads threw firebombs into two 
houses, both inhabited by Turkish families. Nine people were injured and three others 
died.' 
The current situation in Germany is characterized by social, political, economic, 
demographical and ideological changes and represents a development that takes place all 
over Europe, especially since the fall of the Communist systems in Eastern Europe. 
Violent actions have been accompanied by an increase in support for right-wing 
organizations, not only in Germany, but also in Austria, France, Italy and Russia.2 The 
increase of racist violence has invited the inquiry of cultural critics, ethnologists, 
historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and the public. In the US, the 
discussions about the situation in Germany, especially in the press, often seem highly 
emotional because of Germany's historical past. High levels of racist violence are often explained in terms of "national character." For example, the violent attacks in 
Hoyerswerda and Rostock, Germany were sometimes interpreted by other Europeans as 
indicative of a re-emergence of "the true German," or as, "the Germans showing their real 
faces."  In their direct and general forms, explanations like these may represent in 
themselves ethnocentric or racist ways of thinking. 
While part of this analysis will focus on Germany's socioeconomic situation, and 
therefore on explanations regarding the macro-level of the discussion, it is crucial to 
analyze individual motives and group dynamics in order to better understand why young 
people decide to carry out violent right-wing attacks. 
It has also been argued that youth violence finds its root cause in popular culture. 
Especially, politicians seem eager to look for an easy explanation for the phenomenon of 
youth violence. However, traditional cultural critics, in line with the Frankfurt School, 
have convincingly argued the possible consequences of cultural texts on social behavior, 
such as Theodor Adorno's 1941 influential essay, "On Popular Music." "Text" refers 
herein to the written commentary, documentary and/or terminology of particular cultural 
activity domains, such as drama, film, music, poetry and dance. 
Opponents of the Frankfurt School model discuss social behavior as a response to 
social structures. They describe forms of youth expression as a "search for a style," 
which "...is really part of a deeper search for a meaning and identifiable pattern in life."3 
With respect to right-wing youth violence, it is challenging to take a closer look at the 
meaning of the subculture's 'Oi' music and its glorification of violent acts. It is crucial, 
however, to include in the discussion the development of different theories on identity 4 
formation, which have undergone changes not unlike the progressive changes of social 
structures after the second World War, in order to get an overview of the many factors 
involved when searching for the causes of right-wing youth violence. 
But, a project such as this one inevitably leads to the consideration of larger issues 
regarding Germany's historical past, right-wing extremism in Europe and the network of 
the International Nazi Cooperation,4 which to a certain extent has also triggered and 
supported racist and right-wing violence among youth. 
Main sources for this thesis are works by Alfred Adler, Theodor W. Adorno, 
Bruno Bettelheim, Erik Erikson, Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm, Stuart Hall, Dick 
Hebdige, Fredric Jameson, Kenneth Kenniston, David Riesman and others. A 
psychosocial approach to the subject of right-wing youth violence will be adopted. This 
approach will support the argument that right-wing youth violence is a side effect of 
developmental capitalism and that it does not find its root causes in cultural texts, such as 
music, for example. Subcultures absorb individuals who cannot function amid the 
dynamic social changes of capitalist development. Youth anger and anxiety is expressed 
as racist violence as young people seek someone to blame for their isolation from 
mainstream society. ENDNOTES
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YOUTH VIOLENCE IN GERMANY'S HISTORY 
The phenomenon of youth "deviance" in Germany is not new. Forms of deviant 
youth groups can be found during the Wilhelminian Society (1888-1918), the Weimar 
Republic (1919-1934), the Hitler Regime (1934-1945) and the post-war period. Groups 
emerge analogously to occurring changes in social structuring. 
Deviant Youth in the Era of Emperor William II 
From the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of World War I academic 
discussion focused on the disciplinary proceedings of male proletarian youth in big 
cities.1 The perception of youth as a danger to society during this era resulted from a very 
strong delineation of class structures. Adolescents coming from the lower class were 
described as non-conforming and threatening to Wilhelminian society. Benno Hafeneger 
cites Walther Classen, a reform pedagogue (1906), on the prototype of a deviant 
adolescent in Jugend-Gewalt: Zwischen Erziehung, Kontrolle and Rezession. "He grows 
up to be a mean scoundrel, defiant, lazy, impertinent. He lies, skips school, smokes 
cigarettes in church and steals apples. In street fights he appears to be the club-swinging 
leader. Despite all this he is not a bad guy. His comrades say he is really a nice guy after 
all. "` Whoever behaved in a hostile manner against order, regularity, work and duty, was 
non-conforming and deviant in Wilhelminian society. 
The process of industrialization involved structural changes in German society. 
With the emergence of urbanization, youth became more and more the object of educational reform. The political notion of proletarian youth as dangerous and 
threatening helps explain the development of a new academic interest in the situation. 
Explanations for deviant youth had previously existed on a medical basis only. Suddenly 
the state, the church, the sciences and society at large began to show high interest in the 
matter. Social problems were transformed into academic problems. Theories regarding 
the loss of authority within families, the loss of authority within institutions (state, 
church, military, sport) as well as first, milieu-connected theories were discussed.' 
Deviant Youth in the Weimar Republic 
In the 1920's, and especially in the last years of the Weimar Republic, academic 
discussion was concentrated on recalcitrant and neglected youth and deviant behavior, 
violence, delinquency and non-conformist movements. In the discussion on causes of 
deviance, social scientists linked various psychological factors to each other, recognizing 
new theoretical bases, concepts and approaches to analysis. The development of the 
concept of identity and its formation became central topics in academia. Freud's theories 
in psychoanalysis were joined by Carl Gustav Jung's and Alfred Adler's psychoanalytic 
theories on identity formation. 
In Weimar Germany, discussion focused on the emergence of "gangs," or "wild 
cliques," which showed high potential for aggressive behavior towards society at large. A 
notable change of perspectives began to occur in the psychosocial discussion. For the 
first time, "integration through education"4 symbolized a change of attitudes towards the 
perception of deviant youth. Provoked by social, cultural and political upheaval, as well 8 
as drastic changes in the bourgeois society of the Weimar Republic, the discussion gained 
a new perspective. 
Gangs in the Weimar Republic consisted mainly of lower class male youths who. 
within their organizations, reacted against the social, cultural and political context of their 
society.  Hafeneger argues that gangs in this period were discussed by sociologists and 
psychologists as being "...a product of the situation in the Weimar Republic which is 
determined by social disintegration, economic crisis, unemployment, catastrophic living 
conditions, bad nutrition and health situation, social and political polarization as well as 
financial problems on the sides of the state and its communities."5 
Psychologists put emphasis on the perception of individuals and their problems 
rather than on the perception of state, church, political parties, or the Weltanschauung in 
which the individual had to fit. 
Deviant Youth under the Hitler-Regime 
The perception of deviant youth in the totalitarian state under Hitler included a 
new context. Young people who did not belong to the so-called Hitler Youth were 
defined as deviant and declared to be subversive and illegal. Hafeneger points out in his 
work that such youth "...had to be gotten hold of, pursued and exterminated,"6 quoting an 
official writing published in 1941 by the youth leader of the German Reich. From the 
perspective of the Nazis, deviance and criminality was suspected among youth who 
organized themselves into groups, gangs or cliques outside the Hitler Youth Corps and 9 
who were suspected to be either hostile to the "ideologies" of the state, homosexuals, 
Marxists or thieves. 
The discussion about deviant youth during this period was ideological rather than 
academic. It did not allude to any approaches applied during the Wilhelminian Era nor to 
concepts of psychosocial cognition raised during the Weimar Republic. "Deviant" youth 
became the state's enemy and had to be extinguished -- according to Nazi logic  not by a 
sympathetic pedagogy but by separation and elimination from the "well adjusted" 
mainstream.? 
Deviant Youth in Post-War Germany 
In post-war democratic Germany the discussion on deviant youth followed the 
ideas and cognition theories which were developed during the Weimar Republic, while 
new terminology was used to describe homeless adolescents, neglected youth, teenage 
louts and youths participating in riots.8 In this time period, critics and scientists like Erik 
Erikson and Bruno Bettelheim researched the field of youth, its crises, the nature of 
identity and its connection to social structures. Inspired by the emergence of a variety of 
subcultures -- Hippies, Mods, Reggaes, Rastas, Rudies, Punks and Skinheads 
sociologists, cultural historians, and also members of industry began talking about the 
phenomenon of youth culture. Jon Lewis points out in the introduction to The Road to 
Romance and Ruin: Teen Films and Youth Culture, that "...today, in order to study youth 
culture adequately, we must focus on the essential paradox of youth as both mass 
movement and mass market."9 10 
Historically, youth in post-war Germany were seen as the generation which 
experienced a Hitler Youth education during early childhood and now had to adjust to a 
democratic system in West-Germany and to a socialist system in East-Germany. In fact, 
this adjustment had been problematic for this generation because it demanded that they 
give up all ideologies that were pounded into their heads throughout childhood. The 
youth generation of the Nazi Regime had to repress these experiences of "lost childhood," 
since the topic of Hitler was banished from public discussion. It was not until the post­
war generation started questioning their parents and grandparents about what had 
happened during the war that the public started digesting experiences, which subsequently 
led to open discussion. 
Different subcultures emerged under the new democratic system, which allowed 
free expression. In the new, fast-progressing mass market economy, industries took 
advantage of "target-marketed" youth in advertisements, television, music and movies. 
Political, psychosocial and public interest focused more on small group research and 
specific youth actions and power, rather than on living conditions, experiences and the 
expectations of youth. Reflection on social and political structures which affected the 
forms of expression of the youth culture and which might even have caused aggressive or 
violent behavior continued to be exposed, especially in the public discussion. 
Youth in post-war West-Germany participated in the growing affluent society and 
in Germany's economic miracle. Ideologies which developed under Hitler were either 
repressed or ignored, and the production of material wealth became more and more 
important. The developing ideology of materialism, however, did not seem to call for 11 
rebellion on behalf of the young. Nevertheless, youth riots occurred in this time period, 
especially after concerts, sport events, fairs and movies. Property was destroyed and 
conflicts with authority increased.10 Violence, though, was directed against property, 
members of other cliques and against the authorities, but not against members of minority 
groups on the basis of skin color, religion, and ethnic or national origin. 
An extreme type of violence appeared during the 1970's with the radical leftist 
Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany, now known as the Red-Army Faction. To understand 
this more modern form of terrorism it is necessary to understand the socio-political 
climate of the 1960s. This generation had grown up with no memory of World War II, 
and in the United States and Western Europe, many of this generation were in college. In 
the United States, for example, social protest was a common consequence of the civil-
rights movement. College-age young people became conscious of many social and 
economic wrongs. After 1965, with the heavy American involvement in the Vietnam 
War, students found a new reason for protest. In Western Europe as well, college 
students joined in protests and campus sit-ins against the war and demanded reform in 
their institutions of higher learning. Another aspect of the modern world caught the 
attention of the young. It was the existence of the Third World, underdeveloped 
countries, where millions of people lived in brutal and endless poverty. They blamed this 
poverty on the industrialized nations, since so much of the Third World had once been 
colonized by Europe. What the younger generation wanted was to change everything all 
at once, and this yearning led eventually to the formation of small bands of people 
devoted to change by violence. 12 
The German Baader-Meinhof Gang, for example, adhered in its organizational 
form to terrorism and anarchism. The chief tenet of anarchism is that government and 
private property should be abolished. Also part of anarchism is the notion that the people 
should be allowed to live in free associations, sharing work and its products. 
Accordingly, Baader-Meinhof's acts were directed against the German democratic 
system. 
The historical development of youth violence is important for the subsequent 
discussion on its correlation with capitalist progress. Forms of youth deviance often are 
interpreted as a youth problem and not as a society problem. History shows, though, that 
there was a connection between the ongoing changes which took place in social structures 
and the increase in youth deviance. Present forms of deviance continue to change, 
corresponding with social changes and fostering a growing tendency among adolescents 
to use violence. Violence is an extreme form of expression which inevitably attracts the 
public's attention. It raises the legitimate questions, "To what situation shall violence 
draw attention? What conditions provoke this extreme form of expression? Who is to 
blame for the release of anxiety in violence?" 13 
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RIGHT-WING YOUTH GROUPS IN REUNITED GERMANY:
 
THEIR SYMBOLS AND THEIR TARGETS
 
Youth violence in today's Germany has increased. Violent actions among 
adolescents are not only found in racist and right-wing youth groups associated with the 
Skinheads or neo-Nazis, but also in left-wing, anarchist youth groups mainly associated 
with the Punks, or Antifa (abbreviation for "antifascist"). Another place where violence 
has become an every-day picture is the school. Violence in schools is a more autonomous 
form which can hardly be linked to political motivations, but it is related. Whereas 
motives might overlap in some instances with other groups, the symbols and targets of 
right-wing youth groups are rather unique. 
Nazi Skinheads are a highly specific subculture. Members of groups are 
recognizable by their outfits. They wear either Doc Martens boots or Federal Army 
Paratrooper boots, brown or green bomber jackets, green or camouflage-printed army 
trousers, and they have special brands of sportswear. Their hair is mostly shaved. They 
use the swastika as one of their symbols. Their tattoos I sometimes indicate to which 
brotherhood they belong. 'Oi' music is a central element of the Nazi Skinhead 
subculture, "...racially radicalizing and militarizing white youth,"2 Eric Jensen points out 
in his essay, "International Nazi Cooperation: A Terrorist-Oriented Network." A number 
of British rock groups perform frequently in Germany and are popular with the neo-
Nazis. A particular favorite is Skrewdriver, which has at times been banned from 
performing in Germany. Skrewdriver 's lead singer, Ian Stuart, recently died in a car 
accident. The band's music, especially since Stuart's death, has become a legend to fans 15 
and a model for other right-wing bands, who recently collectively published a double CD 
collection of Skrewdriver songs, "The Flame that never dies," featuring 24 right-wing 
bands, including Bound for Glory, Endstufe, Rahowa, The Voice, Centurion, No Remorse, 
Berserkr, Stigger, Squadron, The Bully Boys, The WA.Y., Extreme Hatred, Svastika, and 
others. 
An information record found on the World Wide Web, explains 'Oi' music: 
Oi was a progression from punk. Skinheads who emerged after the two 
tone ska revival, but wanted a harder edge of music for the skinheads, 
never chart material and often to right (or left) wing for general 
acceptance. Still Oi was never about rock and roll fame trips. Oi! fans 
were too young to remember 1969 so this was their skinhead music in 
the post 80's. Oi! promoted Skinhead pride and passion, rather than the 
slacker anarchistic scruffy punks.3 
A German group named Beihze Onkelz (Evil Uncles, deliberately mis-spelled) was 
a leading right-wing, "heavy metal" band whose songs were simple messages of hate. 
Recently, though, this group has undergone a transition which allows them to sell their 
music again in Germany, since a number of right-wing labeled bands were prohibited 
from performing or distributing their music in Germany (for a list of right-wing labeled 
and prohibited bands see Appendix A). 
Major recording companies are Rebelles Europeens in France and Rock-o-Rama 
in Germany. Rock-o-Rama was seized by the German authorities in early February 1993, 
including records, cassettes and CDs from the Nazi Skinhead music scene. Rock-o-Rama 
had functioned as distributor of Skrewdriver and other right-wing bands. 16 
Some other names of German bands are: Storkraft (Destructive Force), whose 
most popular song, "Soldner" (Mercenaries), includes the lines: "He's a skinhead and a 
Fascist/He's bald-headed and a racist/Moral and heart, he has not/Hate and violence mark 
his face./He loves war and he loves violence/and if you are his enemy/I'll kill you."4 
These lyrics definitely represent the most important criteria a member of the subculture 
has to fulfill  the outer appearance code, the coolness, he must be amoral, a racist, white, 
and dedicated to fight for the subculture; he must show patriotism and clear devotion to 
the group. 
Other band names are Volkszorn (Public Anger); Blut und Ehre (Blood and 
Honor); Macht und Ehre (Power and Honor); Boots Brothers; Noie Werte (New Values); 
Volkstreue (people's loyalty) and Endstufe (Final Step), whose most popular song among 
skinhead fans is titled, "Kanaken" (an insulting word for colored foreigners), and includes 
these lines: "They stink...they come here to Germany and live on the dole...They'll just 
have to be killed...Stick them in the dungeon or the KZ (concentration camp)...Kill their 
children, defile their women, exterminate their race."5 
Jillian Becker mentions in his work, Neo-Nazism: A Threat to Europe, the 
existence of pro-Nazi electronic games, which have been selling well on the black market 
since the 1980s. Becker relates: "...in a typical game the winner 'cleans up' Germany of 
its communists, Jews, Turks, `Ossis' [Eastern Europeans] and blacks."6 
Targets of right-wing youth groups are members of minority groups on the basis 
of skin color, religion, and ethnic, cultural or national origin. Targets are also buildings, 
properties and institutions because they represent these groups or their interests. 17 
Two questions arise here. "What are the motives for adolescents to join right-
wing or racist youth groups?" and "What conditions produce these motives?" 
The Debate on Cultural Texts and their Influence on Social Behavior 
Some politicians argue that the causes for youth violence are to be found in 
popular culture, John Davidson says in the article, "Menace to Society," published in the 
Rolling Stone magazine of February 22, 1996. Especially, politicians seem eager looking 
for a scapegoat to blame youth's violent behavior on. This draws attention away from 
actual issues, such as poverty, domestic abuse, social instability, social identity, 
education, politics, economy, race, gender, religion, and other issues, and it also promises 
votes. 
The debate on violence and culture is likely to be a key issue in the US 
presidential campaign of 1996. In Davidson's article one reads that, "Republican 
presidential front-runner Bob Dole, conservative guru William Bennett, black activist C. 
DeLores Tucker and liberal Democrat Sen. Paul Simon all have attacked portrayals of 
violence, treating the link between art and reality as gospel truth."' 
Unfortunately, the political debate tends to ignore the nuances and uncertainties 
about cultural texts being a trigger for anti-social behavior and leaves out the 
investigation of other causes. With the presidential race heating up, however, the 
rhetorical battle is not likely to cool down any time soon. Dole is demanding in his 
campaign ads, "Hollywood, stop corrupting our children."8 He has also said on the 
Senate floor: "Those who continue to deny that cultural messages can and do bore deep 18 
into the hearts and minds of our young people are deceiving themselves and ignoring 
reality."9 
At this point, it becomes inevitable to investigate the relationship between cultural 
texts and social behavior. Youth culture expresses itself through a variety of cultural 
texts, like movies, music, and dancing, for example. It continuously represents itself 
"...in terms of the products it buys, the art that defines it, and the art it defines as its own," 
as Jon Lewis describes in his work, The Road to Romance and Ruin: Teen Films and 
Youth Culture. 
`Oi' music embodies the kind of music right-wing youth listen to. It provides an 
interesting cultural text with respect to its meaning as "anthem," or, "provocation." As 
mentioned earlier, some politicians seem desperate to argue that this cultural text is 
ultimately responsible for young people's violent behavior. It seems legitimate to 
examine the music's potential as a stimulant for violent behavior; but to argue that the 
music is the ultimate cause ignores many other factors, whether psychological or social, 
that come into play when adolescents actually commit violent crimes. 
Cultural critics often tie their arguments to cultural texts and the texts importance 
and influence on subcultural emergence. They seem to forget the social pre-conditions 
which enable the cultural text to emerge and then become influential. Hence, the 
following analysis of Skrewdriver 's lyrics will support the arguments made by cultural 
critics that the cultural text includes the power to stimulate ideologies and behavior, but it 
cannot be declared to be the root cause for right-wing youth group violent behavior. 19 
`Oi' Music is "Warrior Music" 
Looking at the lyrics of the British band Skrewdriver, one can argue that the texts 
are brutalizing and inciting to violence and racial hatred. One of their songs, "Before the 
Night Falls," includes the lines: 
They come here to this country from jungles and from trees/The traitors 
in the parliament give them a better deal/Spend the nation's money, to 
cater to their needs/They all accept our charity, then bite the hand that 
feeds...European unity, the North teutonic dream/...But now our once 
proud Europe, looks like a melting pot/But melting pots boil over, and 
it's getting pretty hot/Chorus: Before the night falls, heed the White 
call... (see Appendix B) 
It is obvious that "they" refers to the immigrants and asylum seekers who come to 
England from other countries and who form the so-called, "melting pot"  a pot that 
includes all kinds of races, cultures and ethnic origins. The band proclaims that these 
people live on the country's taxes and are not grateful at all. Instead, they "...bite the 
hand that feed." The band accuses the British government of being traitors and of giving 
"them" preference. Skrewdriver calls for the "European unity" to defend their "teutonic 
dream." The chorus urges not to wait any longer and invites the "Whites" to pay 
attention to what is going on, encouraging them to do something against this influx of 
foreigners. 
Supported by fast, loud, and mainly simplistic music, this text becomes a 
powerful proclamation for its fans to act. Suddenly, the violent potential inherent to most 
of the fans gets channeled toward a common target, which nicely fits the scapegoat 20 
position and which can be made responsible for all the things that went wrong in their 
personal lives. The music indicates a target and points at specific enemies. 
Skrewdriver 's song, "White Power," follows the same patterns. It also accuses the 
people and the government to just "...stand and watch" how the "...country is going down 
the drain." They are "...letting them come over," and now they "...have got the slum." 
The chorus again, urges not to wait any longer to defend "White" interests: "White 
power, for England/White power, today/White power, for Britain/Before it gets too late." 
Other Skrewdriver song choruses call for the same actions. "Europe Awake" demands 
that "Europe awake, for the white man's sake/Europe awake, before it's too late/Europe 
awake, Europe awake now." The chorus in, "If You're White," includes the lines: "If 
you're white, you're all right/If you're white, today/If you're white, you're all right/If 
you're white, O.K." A great many more songs support this clearly racist attitude of 
Skrewdriver 's music and text that highly incite to violence and racial hatred. 
Skrewdriver 's long-term intentions are made very clear with the lead singer, Ian 
Stuart's, songbook introduction. He writes: 
These lyrics reflect my hopes for the white race in the future. Until the 
white people throughout the world awaken, these lyrics will remain as 
lyrics, and hopes, but eventually I believe that the situations forced 
upon white people, will bring about an awakening, the likes of which 
have never been seen before. Our people have been used as pawns by 
the capitalists, and put false hopes in the Communists, for far too long. 
I believe that the white man will arise and take back all that has been 
taken away from him.  Taken not by force, but by typical Semitic 
deception. No longer will weaklings rule the white man by lies and 
deceit, but the warrior will make his comeback, and rule by strength, 
honesty and love for his race.  It is up to you to make these lyrics come 
true. For all too long it has been the few, fighting for the survival of the 
white race. We have to become a mass movement to smash the twin 
tyrannies of Capitalism and Communism. Go out and join a Nationalist 21 
party in whatever country you come from and help bring about the 
White National Revolution. White Man Awake.'° 
Ian Stuart Donaldson was one of the most important figures in the British right-
wing scene, and it seems that despite or just because of his death he remained important 
to his fans. With his "Blood and Honor" organization he was one of the leaders of the 
violence-oriented part of the British youth culture that included also distribution 
companies, Erik Jensen points out in his essay. Skrewdriver cooperated with other bands 
in European countries. "In Sweden they had a faithful audience among the White Aryan 
troopers in the 'Storm network'," Jensen points out. In Germany they held concerts 
organized by Deutsche Alternative that put them in touch with German bands. "Deutsche 
Alternative," so Jensen says, "...has good connections to the British National Party, who 
work together with 'Blood and Honor'."I I  After an incident in Cottbus, Germany in the 
fall of 1991, where excited youths ravaged the surrounding neighborhood after a 
Skrewdriver concert, the band was no longer allowed to perform in Germany. 
Not only does Skrewdriver glorify the violence and the hatred against other races, 
it also reassures the subculture by giving it a form of self-confidence and pride in its 
beliefs. In the song "One Day," for example, Skrewdriver admits that "...certain thoughts 
are now a crime," and also enforces the belief that "...our strength has come from ideals 
many years old, a strength that has survived within our blood." The history and the racial 
heritage, therefore, justify the battle and the existing ideologies among Skrewdriver fans. 
It serves empowerment and gives them the strength and self-confidence they need to 
realize their goals. Still, it is obvious that the fans provide an ideal ground for the imposition of ideologies, since they already constitute a violence-fixated subculture. It 
should be clear that this violence has its roots in a much larger range of social processes 
and psychological and/or ideological motivations than just in music. The music simply 
plays its part in amplifying these processes. 
In fact, Ingo Hasselbach, a former German right-wing leader, points out in his 
book, Fiihrer-Ex: Memoirs of a former Neo-Nazi, that "...the basic requirement for 
indoctrination was youth." Hasselbach claims that the purpose of indoctrination was not 
to make them (youth) more violent but to take the violence that was in them already and 
channel it in a directed and political useful manner." 12 He also mentions that his 
organization focused on teenagers whose minds were fully open to his organization's 
cause and that they mostly looked for kids, fourteen- to sixteen-year-olds, wearing 
bomber jackets and Doc Martens boots, upon whom to impose their indoctrination.13 
As I mentioned earlier, cultural criticism has mainly focused on the impact of 
cultural texts on social behavior and on the emergence of subcultures. 'Oi' music 
challenges the discussion since it does not fit the margins of a "popular" or a "mass 
cultural" text. This text is hardly available in general record stores. Currently in 
Germany, no record store is allowed to sell right-wing labeled music. In the US, this 
music is not prohibited, but in general, distributors do not want to deal with the eventual 
consequences of distributing this kind of music. The only way to obtain this music is 
either through anonymous record companies, which advertise on the World Wide Web 
(Resistance Records Inc., for example, see Appendix C), or through people who belong to 
the scene who have more information on how to obtain the music through other sources. 23 
Nevertheless, 'Oi' music plays out Theodor Adorno's notion of a "standardized" 
text in popular music, but to a different ideological effect. Adorno, a representative of the 
Frankfurt School, argues in his 1941 essay, "On Popular Music," that a fundamental 
characteristic of popular music is "standardization." Musical details are substitutable, 
and pre-given by the "Culture Industry." "Listening to popular music," Adorno argues, 
"...is manipulated by promoters and music itself into a system of response 
mechanisms."I4 
In the case of Skrewdriver, the listening is manipulated by the promoters of right-
wing ideologies which confirm the listeners' response mechanisms. Musically and 
textually, the songs are indistinguishable from one another and promote the same ideas 
over and over again  racial hatred, white pride and the justification of violence. Thus, 
the standardization gives way to a unifying ritual that concludes in "authoritarian 
collectivism."15 The problem with Adorno's argument is that he takes for granted the 
transformation of a creative people into a passive mass. He argues that standardized 
music prohibits the effort to think or create. He does not take into account any social 
pressures which underlie this passiveness. 
In the essay, "Listening to Popular Music," published by David Riesman in 1950, 
it is stressed that the subculture has a considerable impact upon the adolescent listener. 
"What youth perceive in the mass media is framed by their perception of the peer group 
to which they belong," Riesman argues and continues that, "...it is the pressure for 
conformity with the group that invites and compels the individual to have recourse to the 
media both in order to learn from them what the group expects and to identify with the 74 
group by sharing a common focus for attention and talk."16 There is a "...fear to be 
caught liking what the others have decided not to like,"17 Riesman convincingly argues. 
He concludes that musical taste provides revealing clues to somebody's character. In 
other words, part of a pre-requisite of musical taste is the character of an individual which 
has been pre-determined by its social environment and upbringing -- parents, friends, 
education, etc.. This would support the argument that the cultural text is not solely 
responsible for violent actions, but that social pre-conditions determine whether a person 
is open to be manipulated by it or not. 
In their 1964 essay, "The Young Audience," Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel 
discuss teenage culture as a response to a "...frequently bewildering and confused social 
situation." This response in direct terms can contextualize a radical political energy. 
This radicality in some cases, as Fredric Jameson argues in his essay, "Reification and 
Utopia in Mass Culture," might just embody "ideological" and "utopian" elements; it 
explores the forbidden, but only to finally "recontain" them by reconciling the consumer 
to current power arrangements. 
In the case of Skrewdriver, one has to deal with a radicality which not only 
explores the boundaries of the forbidden, but also encourages the crossing over of these 
boundaries and the acting out of an anti-social behavior. The "subversive" character of 
`Oi' music revolts against the conventional values of a society. A youth minority, 
enthusiastic over Skrewdriver 's, "White Power" song, is dangerous for society as a 
whole. As a consequence, the German government prohibited right-wing bands from 
performing and distributing their music, since they threaten the ideals of a democratic 25 
system, especially with respect to human rights. This music resembles -warrior music" 
and has been, at least for the German government, no longer acceptable as a harmless 
subcultural sign or icon that functions as "semiotic guerrilla warfare," as Dick Hebdige 
argues in "Style as Homology and Signifying Practice." This cultural text goes beyond a 
discussion on semiotics. Instead, it resembles a real threat to democratic values which, at 
the same time, does not signify the cultural text to be a root cause for right-wing violent 
behavior. ENDNOTES 
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The Socio-Economic Situation after Germany's Reunification 
Tore Bjorgo and Rob Witte point out in their work, Racist Violence in Europe, 
that certain socio-economic situations nurture the levels of racist violence while others 
deny a connection between the two. It is important to mention the harsh socio-economic 
situation Germany was facing after reunification in 1990 that might have also played a 
role, since members of the population might have perceived foreign groups as unwanted 
rivals in the competition for scarce jobs and social resources. At the turn of 1992, 
unemployment rose by 325,000 to a national figure of 3.45 million. To be added to these 
figures are 2.1 million on job-creation schemes and 875,000 on short-time working: 6.4 
million in all.' By 1996, the situation was even worse. 
It should be noted that the political reunification had to deal with the extreme 
socio-economic differences between West and East Germany. Consequently, we have to 
talk about two societies differing above all in terms of socialization. West Germany is 
dominated by a society with individualization processes, while East Germany used to be 
dominated by repressive and authoritarian processes now replaced by new demands.2 
These differences have to be taken into account in any description. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, 
professor of Socialization Research at the University of Bielefeld in Germany, points out 
in his work, Rechtsextremistische Orientierungen bei Jugendlichen: 
...adolescents in East German states now have to cope with a twofold 
transformation process: the first is the transfer from the planned to the 
individualized  society. The second  is  the transformation of the 29 
adolescent phase from an ambivalent role of repression and externally 
controlled security into an autonomous adolescent life-phase for which 
the adolescents are forced to take active responsibility with all  its 
consequences.' 
It is undeniable that individuals in the GDR grew up under authoritarian and 
repressive conditions which consequently led to fairly narrow world-views and 
stereotypical images of 'good' communist and 'wicked' capitalist systems. The GDR 
also liked to portray itself as anti-fascist and portray the capitalist systems as forms of 
fascism.4 In other words, being thrown into a society in which regimentation and a 
certain sense of security to individual lives is largely absent might trigger massive 
anxieties and insecurities. 
In this context, a study from 1950 by Theodor Adorno is worth noting. The claim 
is made that individuals of a certain psychological orientation are attracted by right-wing 
ideas. Adorno argues in The Authoritarian Personality that the distinguishing 
characteristic of the authoritarian personality type is an "...inability to live with 
ambivalence," a tendency to think in terms of stereotypes and fixed categories. The 
authoritarian personality entertains a "totalist" ideology in the sense of not being open to 
alternative information. Such a person systematically filters out any complicating factor 
which might oppose his simple world-view of stereotypical images.5 Adorno argues: 
In the psychodynamics of the "authoritarian character," part of the 
preceding aggressiveness is absorbed and turned into masochism, while 
another part is left over as sadism, which seeks an outlet in those with 
whom the subject does not identify himself: ultimately the outgroup. 
The Jew frequently becomes a substitute for the hated father, often 
assuming, on a fantasy level, the very same qualities against which the 
subject  revolted  in  the  father,  such  as  being  practical,  cold, 
domineering, and even a sexual rival. Ambivalence is all-pervasive, 30 
being evidenced mainly by the simultaneity of blind belief in authority 
and readiness to attack those who are deemed weak and who are 
socially acceptable as "victims." Stereotypy, in this syndrome, is not 
only a means of social identification, but has a truly "economic" 
function in the subject's own psychology: it helps to canalize his 
libidinous energy according to the demands of his overstrict superego.6 
Adomo's article follows classic psychoanalytic descriptions and involves Erich Fromm's 
notion of the "sadomasochistic" or "authoritarian" character, which will be considered 
later this chapter. 
An article found in the German magazine, Der Spiegel, in December 1992, 
supports Adomo's perception of the authoritarian personality. In the article, three 17­
year -old, right-wing activists who, while rejecting Communism, yearn for the activities 
and "community feeling" of their days in the Young Pioneers (the former GDR equivalent 
of the Hitler Youth), give an informative account of their views. After reunification, they 
formed a right-wing comradeship in Radebeul (near Dresden) and in October of 1992, 
joined the National Offensive, a trans-regional, neo-Nazi organization. They call 
themselves National-Socialists, which they define to be, "closeness to the people; wishing 
the best for our people." They want to belong once again to a nation and live in a 
worthwhile national state. They are fearful of the "foreignization" of the German people. 
The flood of asylum-seekers should be stopped. Violence does not solve problems, but it 
does draw attention to them, they argue. They admit that the former ideologies of the 
GDR government gave them "false ideas," but that their life in the former GDR was at 
least more directed. They miss that life now, and they explain that in the West, everyone 
is preoccupied with becoming rich. According to the article, they miss the feeling of 31 
community. Among themselves now (in their organization, they probably meant) they 
have a true community.' 
Authoritarian education and state repression as practiced in the former GDR 
obviously limited the development of self-responsibility. The three 17-year-olds 
mentioned that they missed the guidance of the former GDR. Heitmeyer points out in his 
article, "Hostility and Violence towards Foreigners in Germany," that "...when external 
guidance and controls fall away, hardly any internal orientations, such as meaningful and 
credible moral stances, are present. An anomie situation with a lack of standards and 
rules arises, so that anxiety and uncertainty easily give way to violence."8 
Erich Fromm uses the term, "authoritarian character" in his work, Escape from 
Freedom, in order to describe the phenomenon of people's admiration of authority. He 
argues that the "authoritarian character" is the "human basis of Fascism."9 Fromm uses 
the term in the context of sado-masochistic personalities who show a tendency to submit 
to authority, and, at the same time, want to be authorities themselves. Since "Fascist 
systems call themselves authoritarian because of the dominant role authority plays in their 
social and political structure...,"I° they are, according to Fromm, based on "authoritarian 
characters." 
The extreme economic changes which took place after unification in the former 
GDR caused another form of uncertainty. The closure of many companies which had 
contributed to social integration during the old system led to high unemployment rates 
and to the destruction of people's life contexts. Before unification, everybody was 
assured of a job. Single parents, especially, had the comfort of assured child care while they were working. In today's Germany, this is not the case. The relationship between 
high unemployment rates and the increase in racist violence is not clear yet. But, 
statistics exist and show a mutual increase on both sides since 1970 in West Germany." 
Another argument for this relationship relates to the history of fascism in Germany. 
Unemployment during the Weimar Republic was one factor to fascism under Hitler. 
Other sociological explanations directly associate the increase in ethnic violence 
to an increase in foreign minority groups -- both economic immigrants and asylum-
seekers. This explanation assumes that there is a natural limit to the number of foreign 
immigrants a society can absorb. When this limit is exceeded, conflicts erupt. Tore 
Bjorgo, a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Rob 
Witte, a political scientist, point out in their introduction to Racist Violence in Europe, 
that people sometimes do believe there is a direct, causal relationship between the influx 
of asylum-seekers and an economic recession. "Racist organizations and parties," 
maintain Bjorgo and Witte, "...are always quick to take advantage of such situations to 
channel public discontent and frustration towards 'convenient' objects of hate."12 
Finally, it has been argued that right-wing attitudes and racist violence are subject 
to cultural variables. It has been claimed that a high incidence of political violence may 
be attributed to "national character." Bernt Hagtvet concludes in his essay, "Right-Wing 
Extremism in Europe," regarding the perception of a "national character" explanation, 
that "...the low incidence of racist violence in the Netherlands can thus be attributed to the 
polite and hospitable qualities of the Dutch national character;"I3 while for instance, the 
violent attacks in Hoyerswerda and Rostock in Germany are sometimes interpreted as the 33 
re-emergence of the true German," or as, "the Germans are showing their real face (as 
was mentioned in the introduction)." 
Historical legacies and political culture may play significant roles. But these 
probably operate more on the level of subcultures, where some sections of a society may 
embrace certain violent or racist traditions, while others distance themselves from it. 
Bjorgo and Witte point out that such explanations may sometimes lead to situations in 
which reality is adjusted to fit a nation's cultural self image.'`] Explanations like these 
might incorporate themselves into ethnocentric or racist ways of thinking. 
Possible Consequences of an Abortive Individualization Process 
Since the unification, the former East German youth have had to cope with the 
conditions under which West German young people live. West-German youth were born 
into a society which is grouped around the process of individualization. But this does not 
necessarily mean that they are able to cope with it naturally. Wilhelm Heitmeyer 
describes this process which youth must undergo fairly clearly in his essay, "Hostility and 
Violence towards Foreigners in Germany." He argues that, "...individuals not only can 
but also must shape their own path through life; in the final analysis, they have to bear the 
risks of failure alone. Anxiety engendered by the risk of failure and isolation as a result 
of increased individual competition is a major source of feelings of estrangement."15 
Social status and identity are no longer givens but have to be achieved through personal 
effort with a great risk of failure -- particularly in times of social and economic crises. 
The trend among young Germans to define their identity in terms of characteristics such 34 
as, "race," and "nationality," might be seen as an attempt to solve this dilemma, 
Heitmeyer points out. 
A related argument is found in the socio-psychological theories of Erich Fromm, 
who explains the advent of interwar fascism as an "...escape from freedom."I6 He claims 
that political extremism is a response to the uncertainties and complexities which lie at 
the core of liberal-democratic societies. Modern society confuses the needs of younger 
citizens with its enormous variety of roles and expectations and its extraordinary freedom 
to select life-styles and careers.17 
The Concept of Identity Formation 
In the context of individualization processes, it is crucial to outline the concepts of 
identity formation that have changed according to the demands of progressive social 
structures. One of the first concepts on identity formation was delivered by Sigmund 
Freud. Freud divided the structure of human personality into three components: id, ego, 
and superego. The id is the instinctual part of the personality and contains all the basic 
drives and emotions that come from the animal nature in humans. At the other extreme is 
the superego. It encompasses cultural values, ideals, and rules of conduct acquired from 
parents. The id is always in conflict with the superego. To mediate between the id and 
the superego, people gradually build a third structure, called the ego. The role of the ego 
is to see that the drives of the id are reasonably fulfilled without disturbing the superego. 
The ego is brought into play by anxiety, an emotion triggered by any potential conflict 35 
between the id and the superego. If the ego is not strong enough to manage the conflict, 
the result is neurosis. 
Although Freud's theories were initially rejected by the scientific community, he 
attracted a number of distinguished followers. Some of his students diverged from his 
psychoanalytic theories and started schools of their own. The Swiss psychiatrist, Carl 
Gustav Jung (1875-1961), whom Freud hoped would take over his leadership in the 
psychoanalytic movement, eventually developed his own field of psychology, called 
Analytical Psychology. Jung introduced the terms, "introversion" and "extroversion," as 
basic personality orientations. He was also one of the first to discuss what is now known 
as, "Developmental Psychology." 
Another of Freud's followers, who eventually started his own school of 
psychology was the Austrian psychiatrist, Alfred Adler (1870-1937). In his theory of 
individual psychology, Adler argued that the problem at the core of neurosis was a feeling 
of inferiority. In contrast to Jung and Freud, both of whom placed great emphasis on 
unconscious inner forces in human development, Adler was more concerned with the 
influence of social experience. 
A second generation of practitioners, called neo-Freudians, tried to expand upon 
Freud's original work by taking into account factors such as society and culture, or the 
general environment. One of them was the above cited psychoanalyst and social 
philosopher, Erich Fromm (1900-1980), who argued provocatively in Escape from 
Freedom, that freedom in and of itself is stressful. He claimed that in some societies the 
populace follows a dictator in order to be relieved of the stress of having to make 36 
decisions. hi Escape from Freedom, Fromm described various personality types that 
evolved out of the need to deal with freedom-caused anxiety. The "authoritarian 
character," the "destructive character," and the "automaton conform character," who 
adopts entirely the kind of personality that is offered to him by cultural patterns. 
Another figure who has to be mentioned here is Erik Erikson (1902), who was an 
artist and teacher in Vienna before he became interested in the psychoanalysis of children. 
After entering psychoanalysis, he underwent training to become a psychoanalyst himself 
and moved to the United States in the early 1930's. Erikson's broad-based conception of 
human nature was the result of years of research with American Indians, returned 
servicemen, and adolescent offspring of wealthy families, as well as his literary and 
artistic interests.I8 Like Jung, Erikson arrived at a view of individual development that 
included the whole span of human development. In his classic work, Childhood and 
Society, Erikson described eight stages of life  infant age, age two to three, preschool 
years, primary school years, puberty, young adulthood, adulthood, old age  which 
encompassed the whole cycle from birth to death. At each stage, the individual must 
resolve a psychosocial crisis in a positive way in order for healthy development to 
continue. Erikson argues in his essay, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," that as young 
people attempt to gain social influence, they struggle for self-definition. "It is the young 
who, by their responses and actions, tell the old whether life as represented by the old and 
as presented to the young has meaning," Erikson writes, "and it is the young who carry in 
them the power to confirm those who confirm them and, joining the issues, to renew and 
to regenerate, or to reform and to rebel."I 9 37 
Next to Erikson, the psychologist Bruno Bettelheim (1903-1990) has to be 
mentioned for his pioneering work in the treatment and education of emotionally 
disturbed children. Based on experiences in the concentration camps (Bettelheim was 
imprisoned during the German Nazi-Regime), the work examined human adaptability to 
stress. Bettelheim concerned himself with the relationship between social problems and 
the rearing of children. In his essay, "The Problem of Generations," he discourses on 
youth's search for identity: 
As one delinquent youngster complained, "You can't live, if there's 
nothing to push against," what he meant is that you cannot test your 
own worth, your own strength and vitality, the very things you feel 
most dubious about as an adolescent, when all you can push against is a 
vacuum, or an adult society more than ready to give way, to act more 
youthful than even befits youth. Without something definite to push 
against, youth feels lost. Many causes are embraced by youth, not for 
the cause itself, but because in fighting for it, its strength can be tested 
against something. Hence youth favors causes that run against 
established order, even an ultraconservative cause, because nothing is 
quite so safe a testing ground as the well-established order.2° 
These presented concepts of identity formation might partially apply to the 
demands which social structures require individuals to face today. They are required to 
make decisions which bear success or failure. Adler would have argued that the result of 
such a decision could end in a feeling of inferiority. In Fromm's terms, this "freedom" 
might cause stress and anxiety which could effect the formation of personality. In 
Erikson's theory, this "crisis" has to be resolved positively in order to continue a healthy 
development. In other words, a "wrong" decision would cause failure and would, 
therefore, put a positive identity formation at risk. Finally, Bettelheim would argue that 38 
youth naturally runs against an established order which would partly explain the 
emergence of various subculture groups in a society. 
Excursion: An Ex-Neo-Nazi Talks 
In this context it is worth looking at a recently published autobiography of Ingo 
Hasselbach, an ex-right-wing member and East German founder of the National 
Alternative Neo-Nazi Party, who got out of the movement in 1993. In an excerpt, "How 
Nazis are made," published in The New Yorker (January, 1996), Hasselbach tells about 
his growing up in former East Germany, his motives for joining the right-wing group in 
East Berlin, and the purpose for founding the first neo-Nazi political party in former East 
Germany. 
Hasselbach grew up as the son of members of the Communist elite in the looking-
glass world of the German Democratic Republic. Rebelling against the state and his 
father's communist ideology by joining a group of hippies and punks during his earlier 
years, he found himself in and out of prison. Reflecting the theories of Erikson and 
Bettelheim, Hasselbach points out, "My father's voice was the state, and I directed all my 
rage at it, rather than at him. My rebellion against it (the state) was the ultimate personal 
insult to him. To my father, my friends and I were all children by seeds of capitalism."21 
Hasselbach's hatred of the socialist and "anti- fascist" state grew exponentially during his 
stays in prisons, where, Hasselbach argues, "the German anti-Fascist state carried on with 
the methods and trappings of the German Fascist state." He writes: 39 
I'd seen enough pictures of Nazis to recognize that the GDR guards 
were dressed in a way that was reminiscent of the Nazi guard's black 
uniforms, peaked hats, and boots. The hypocrisy of it bothered me more 
than anything: If you're going to worship power, why not admit it? At 
least the Nazis had been straightforward in their brutality. These people 
insisted that they were beating you and locking you up for your own 
edification and for the sake of universal brotherhood.-2 
In prison he learned a "life in a community without scruples."23 Again, the term 
"community" attracts one's attention, since this is a feeling that the earlier quoted former 
GDR teens do not have anymore and miss. A key point in the struggle of identity 
formation could be the crisis between community and individuality that needs to be 
resolved especially for youth of former East Germany. The demanded individualization 
process within capitalist society seems to be a crucial point in this context, since it 
obviously proves stressful for these adolescents. They are overwhelmed by the sudden 
gained "freedom" to take over decisions regarding their own lives. Individual careers in 
the former GDR depended on the authority's decisions and not on the individual's 
decisions. 
Having grown up under the watchful eye of the Stasi (the GDR's secret police), 
and having been punished for teenage foolishness in the same prisons that housed 
murderers and Gestapo Chiefs, Hasselbach's "identity formation" was destined to lead to 
ambivalence and conflict. One of his cellmates, the former Gestapo chief of Dresden, 
persuaded him that a Jewish world conspiracy was bringing ruin and division to 
Germany. Upon his release from prison in 1988, Hasselbach learned that the protest 
culture within the GDR had split more sharply between right and left and that it seemed 
that the Stasi were favoring leftist punks over right-wing skinheads. This gave him one 40 
last reason to become even more fascist, even though he had belonged at some point 
during his youth to the hippie, and later, the punk cultures. "Gradually, the punks split 
permanently from the hippies, and I went with the punks," Hasselbach writes, "The 
hippies had become too "good" for me. It wasn't enough to protest just by waking up 
whenever I wanted, or sleeping with whomever I wanted. I wanted to go out and make a 
statement."24 
Hasselbach made a statement and founded the country's first Neo-Nazi Political 
Party in 1989. At that time, under the new East German government, headed by Hans 
Modrow, new political parties were being authorized so quickly that few questions were 
asked. For the next four years, he led a violent extremist group in street fighting, 
indoctrinating young members and plotting terrorist attacks. After unification, street 
fights continued, especially against anarchist groups who were devoted to fighting right­
wingers. In earlier GDR times there had been no street battles, since the power of the 
state had been too omnipresent. Hasselbach mentions the two main anti-Fascist, or 
"Antifa" organizations, the Antifa Youth-Front and the Antifa Edelweiss Pirates (named 
after the youth resistance gangs in the Third Reich). Both groups dressed like punks, 
"...with green hair and rings everywhere, and wore Doc Martens boots with red laces or, 
Federal Army Paratrooper boots," he writes. 
Confronted with the fruits of his labors -- firebombed bodies of refugees, the 
anguished faces of survivors and his friendship to Winfried Bonengel, a German 
filmmaker who lived in France and who completed a film on the movement named, 
"We're Back"  Hasselbach began to doubt his politics. Secretly, he began to investigate 41 
the Holocaust revisionism he and his Kamerads propagated, and finally learning the truth 
of the lie he had been living, in 1993 publicly renounced the neo-Nazi movement. 
The Modified Identity Concept 
To the question, "Who are you?" one might answer, "I am the son of my father." 
Today the son and the daughter would answer, "I am who I am. I am responsible for 
myself and I create myself through my own decisions and actions." 
The individual has become a central and responsible figure of his own life 
formation. The project, "life" has become the center of individual planning and 
responsibility. Whether the project succeeds or fails is mainly dependent on the 
individual himself. Not the adjustment and toleration to given outside structures, but the 
free development of personality, has become the focus of modern social theories. This 
autonomy was only able to develop through fast progressing advancements, which will be 
mentioned here briefly. 
First, advancements in medicine have made human reproduction plannable; and 
family planning as well as life planning are the responsibility of the individual. Second, 
the development of democratic governments has made the individual's vote in political 
elections a key in power and authority. Third, a market-oriented economy has given 
individuals the option to decide for themselves and choose different products. And 
fourth, the job-market has opened for both sexes and has lead to greater independence, 
especially for women. 42 
The process of identity formation in childhood and adolescence has obviously 
changed in the last decades. Expanded personal freedoms within progressed social 
structures means subjective autonomy for the individual and, conversely, the loss of 
feelings of security that came from "natural" membership in social groups. This 
subjective autonomy includes the demand for an ability to form independent opinions and 
judgments regarding choices in jobs, partners, numbers of children, world-views, political 
parties, products and social nets. 
It is not difficult to understand that this development does not always find a 
supportive environment, and that it is not always determined to be successful and without 
risks. Nevertheless, the individuals are responsible for a successfully created life-style 
and they cannot blame anybody else for failure. Life is not any longer predetermined by 
external factors. Culture offers a variety of choices from which the individual has to 
select. These crucial and constant decision-making forces are particularly critical during 
adolescence. Society has become "optional" and asks for a mutable self, a "flexible type 
of approach," and "a handicraft mentality."25 
With this diversity and endless number of choices, social critics see the danger of 
overwhelming the individual. The risks of failure are high and some members of society 
are not capable of fulfilling such demands. Confusion, forms of insecurity, helplessness, 
anxiety and alienation gain prevalence. Heitmeyer argues that the ambivalent 
individualization process can lead to problems when adolescents "...increasingly gain the 
impression that they are losing control over their own lives."26 43 
Erikson wrote about the society of the 1950's, in which it was typical for young 
people to have made choices regarding job, partner, religion and other aspects of life, by 
the end of adolescence (at approximately age eighteen). Today socially supported identity 
formation is not necessarily typical. Traditional biographies, life stages, customs and 
traditions seem to no longer exist. There does not seem to be a fixed point in life 
anymore where identity formation can be considered a closed case. 
27 
Heitmeyer expands the theory of crisis within the individualization process by 
adding the critical point of isolation which might follow the experience of insecurity. In 
their struggle for certainties, adolescents may refer to unambiguous norm systems and 
may identify totally with their particular symbols and rituals, whether or not these norm 
systems (groups) may be left-wing or right-wing movements. A particular movement or 
organization might provide them again with the strength and self-confidence they are 
lacking and thereby relieve their individual burdens of responsibility. This adolescent 
struggle is taken advantage of by political parties and organizations who channel their 
crises into one or another form of fear or hatred -- in this context into the hatred of 
minority groups. 
Empowered by association with organizations and political parties, violence is 
able to assume an important role. First, it guarantees attention from others (society, 
media, etc.), and second, it contributes to feelings of powerlessness by establishing others 
as even more powerless. Heitmeyer concludes in his essay that "...there is a very real risk 
that social, occupational, or political processes of disintegration will increase. They will 
lead to increasing violence, because when social responsibility and integration dissolve, individuals no longer consider the consequences of their actions...and a further 
destruction of life contexts attack the very core of identity formation."28 This situation 
inevitably attracts certain political parties and organizations which take advantage of and 
use the seething violent potential within youth groups for their own purposes. 45 
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THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT-WING NETWORK 
In Hasselbach's personal history he mentions that right-wing propaganda and 
training manuals during his time in the movement were distributed by extremist groups in 
the United States, where it is legal to print such materials under guarantees of the First 
Amendment. hi comparison, Germany limits in its constitution the freedom of speech 
when it threatens democracy. Furthermore, it bans the dissemination of Nazi symbols 
and propaganda. Hasselbach also mentions having received from Nebraska via Internet 
handbooks for terror which described the ways to wage a terrorist war against a 
democratic government. At other times he received illegal mail via Denmark, since 
Denmark also has no constitutional limitations which prohibit the publication of 
extremist propaganda.1 
In this context, it becomes important to consider and examine the power of the 
international Nazi Cooperation. Historically, violent social acts have been accompanied 
by an increase in support for right-wing organizations. In Germany, Franz Sch6nhuber's 
Republican Party received 10.9% of the vote in Baden-WUrttemberg in 1993. Jorg 
Haider's Austrian Freedom Party gained 22.6% of the vote in Vienna's municipal 
elections in 1991; Jean-Marie LePen and his nationalist, Front National, received 14% of 
the vote in France during a round in the presidential elections in 1988. In Naples, 
Alessandra Mussolini, received 44% of the vote in mayoral elections in 1993. Also in 
1993, every fourth Russian voter chose Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party, 48 
"making," according to Bernt Hagtvet, "[an] overt anti-Semite the leader of the largest 
single party in the new Russian national assembly."2 
Since growing violence has ties to right-radical youth cultures and the perpetrators 
are quite young, few are organized into political parties. They present, therefore, an 
inviting target-group for parties and organizations. Nazi skinheads, for example, are not 
organized in the conventional sense. They are composed of many smaller groups bound 
to certain localities and are linked together by a highly specific subculture that crosses 
national borders. European Skinhead culture and its links with violence is an "old" 
phenomenon and dates back to the end of the 1960's -- English working-class youth's 
reaction to increasing unemployment.' Initially, skinhead culture was apolitical. Not 
until the late 1970's was there any notable growth in politicization.4 
Today, however, an international, violence-fixated subculture exists next to a 
thoroughly organized Nazi network which tries to exploit its potential. The Nazi network 
does not necessarily cause the escalating violence found in the youth culture, but it seems 
to at least play a role in amplifying violent tendencies by distributing hate-propaganda 
throughout the world. Propaganda material for Germany came from Lincoln, Nebraska, 
and was distributed by the foreign activist group, National Socialist German Workers' 
Party/Exile and Edification Organization (NSDAP/AO). The material included swastika 
stickers and small posters. NSDAP/AO, an acronym for Nationalsozialistische 
Arbeiterpartei /A uslandsorganisation and Aufbauorganisation, publishes newsletters, 
bulletins and other propaganda materials in at least ten languages.5 49 
In 1990, Gary Lauck, front figure of the American Organization, along with 
Michael Ktihnen, front figure of the German movement, went into Scandinavia and 
connected with Sweden's radical faction, Sveriges Nationella Forbund (Sweden's 
National League). Erik Jensen points out in his article that "...this quickly led to the 
building of 'The Nordic National Socialist Bloc', with connections to the terrorist-
oriented 'Storm-network' in Sweden and its Norwegian counterparts."6 Later, 
connections were also established to Denmark's Nazi Party, DNSB. In Germany, the 
Neue Front (New Front) group, under leadership of Michael Ktihnen, who died of AIDS 
in April of 1991, was in close cooperation with Gary Lauck in the USA. Ktihnen 
established contacts to the Spanish group, Circulo Espanol de Amigos de Europa 
(CEDADE), to factions of the Flemish-Belgian group, Vlaamse Militanten Orde (VMO), 
and to factions of the French Faisceaux Nationalistes Europeens (FNE). Other 
connections can be found in Croatia, where Nazi groups supported HSP (The Croatian 
Justice Party) and its militia, HOS (The Croatian Liberation Community). Links to Iraq 
were noticed when France's organization leader, Michel Faci, made an appearance with 
Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.' 
The outlining of this international net of organizations is important for the 
understanding of the different powers that are involved when we not only talk about the 
violent potential of right-wing youth groups and its causes, but also about the external 
influences on these subcultures. The importance of channeling this potential into political 
ideologies became very obvious in Ingo Hasselbach's autobiography, as outlined in the 
chapter, "`Oi' Music is "Warrior Music"." 50 
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CONCLUSION
 
The discussion of right-wing youth violence in Germany needs to be put into a 
frame of reference which is closer to the contemporary economic and social situation 
Germany is facing, now fifty years after the defeat of fascism. Much of the analyses 
found in the literature recognized similarities to the conditions during the Weimar 
Republic and the subsequent fascist government. But, little research exists concerning 
the multitude of events which have occurred since the 1950's. 
The symbols and the victims of the postmodern outrage remind us of the 
perpetrators and crimes committed under the Hitler regime. Yet, it is essential to become 
aware that the powers at play are very real with regard to social, political, economic, 
scientific and technical changes that have taken place. Today's individuals have to apply 
their violent ideologies to this complex society in order to successfully become and stay 
members of postmodern society. The threat of isolation of individuals within this society 
is a large issue that has to be analyzed and treated in further research and social 
application. 
Social integration is a vital component of life. Without it the individual is likely 
to respond aggressively. This form of aggression can be directed inwards or outwards. 
Right-wing violence represents the outward-directed form of aggression. Powerlessness, 
feelings of estrangement, isolation and anxiety naturally cause fear and incalculability of 
actions. In right-wing groups, the fear is channeled into hatred. Cultural texts, such as 
music, movies, and literature support the channeling process by serving as amplifiers. 52 
They cannot be determined as ultimate cause for violent behavior, but under specific 
social conditions. cultural texts can confirm stimuli for violent crimes. 
The necessary adaptability in our rapidly changing social, technical and economic 
environment is so complex and immense that it is necessary to rethink the possible 
consequences when this adaptability is dysfunctional. What will happen to isolated 
"members" of a never-ending advancing society? What will happen to this society when 
the "...destruction of life contexts [of its members] attack the very core of identity 
formation?" I 
At any rate, it is essential to carefully observe the social dimensions of progress in 
relation to right-wing youth subcultures and violence in modern Germany, and also to the 
"constellations and alliances which might threaten peace and democracy in Europe."2 53 
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Appendix A: List of German Right-Wing Labeled and Prohibited Bands 
Aufruhr, Blut und Ehre, Bomber, Boots-Brothers, Bollwerk, Brutale Haie, 
Commando, Pernod, Die Alliierten, Die wahre Pracht, Drom, Elbsturm, Endstufe, 
Entwarnung, Freikorps, Kahlkopf, Kettenhund, Kraft durch Froide, Kraftschlag, 
Kroizfoier, Landser, Legion Condor, Macht und Ehre, Martyrer, Nahkampf, Noie Werte, 
08/15, Offensive, OHL, Oi Dramz, Proissens Gloria, Querschlager, Rabauken, Radikahl, 
Radikahler Ha13, Rheinwacht, Saccara, Skinfield, Sperrzone, Stockel & Strapse, Storkraft, 
Stuka, Sturmtrupp, TonstOrung, Triebtater, United Blood, Volkstreue, Volkszorn, 
Werwolf, Wotans Volk 
(Source: http://members.tripod.com/Wolfpack/sIcrew.htm) 60 
Appendix B: Skrewdriver Lyrics 
Before the Night Falls 
They come here to this country from the jungles and from trees 
The traitors in the parliament give them a better deal 
Spend the nation's money, to cater to their needs 
They all accept our charity, then bite the hand that feeds 
Chorus: 
Before the night falls, heed the White call 
Before the night falls, when the reaper calls you 
Our forefathers fought in two world wars, they thought to keep us free 
But I'm not sure that in those wars, who was our enemy 
The Zionists own the media, and they're known for telling lies 
And I could see, that it could be, we fought on the wrong side 
(Chorus) 
European unity, the North teutonic dream 
To scoop to save humanity, leave Europe with the cream 
But now our once proud Europe, looks like a melting pot 
But melting pots boil over, and it's getting pretty hot 
(Chorus) 
Europe Awake 
Europe what have they got to do to make you come alive 
What has happened to the heritage that once was yours and mine 
A capitalistic economy, the communists roam the streets 
The old people aren't safe outside, what solution do we seek? 
Chorus: 
Europe awake, for the white man's sake 
Europe awake, before it's too late 
Europe awake, Europe awake now 
We've got to get together soon, and take our nations back 
The race board, and the traitorous politicians should be sacked 61 
You can't turn on the t.v. because we know what we're going to see 
Either moaning immigrants, or the lying C.N.D. 
(Chorus) 
We've got to get together now, and wage our nation's fights 
If we don't act quickly, we're going to face the endless night 
We've got to take our nations back, from all the traitorous scum 
You'd better believe it, our day will soon have to come 
(Chorus) 
Tomorrow Belongs to Me 
The sun on the meadow is summery warm 
The stag in the forest runs free 
But gathered together to greet the storm 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
The branch on the linden is leafy and green 
The Rhine gives its gold to the sea 
But somewhere a glory awaits unseen 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
The babe in his cradle is closing his eyes 
The blossom embraces the bee 
But soon says the whisper, arise, arise 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
Chorus:
 
Now Fatherland, Fatherland, show us the sign
 
Your children have waited to see 
The morning will come when the world is mine 
Tomorrow belongs to me 
Tomorrow belongs to me 62 
If You're White 
Read the papers, watch T.V., hear the media lie to me 
On the radio, in the news, you're all wrong except the jews 
Doesn't matter who loses face, if it's against the chosen race 
If you're white, they'll say you're bad, they must think that we're all mad 
Chorus: 
If you're white, you're all right 
If you're white, today 
If you're white, you're all right 
If you're white, O.K. 
They ban our marches, squash our rights, we'll resist with all our might 
There seems to be a moral lack, marches allowed for Reds and Blacks 
They started riots, raised all hell, when thirteen men burnt themselves 
Had their marches, told their lies, when another black committed suicide 
(Chorus) 
Well it's our country, let's take it back, give the race act men the sack 
For the cause some go to jail, and this means that we must never fail 
They'll try and make you feel ashamed for everything our race is blamed 
They'll try and tell you day is night, but don't forget that white is right. 
(Chorus) 63 
Appendix C: Advertising Record Companies on the World Wide Web 
Resistance Records Inc., for example, advertises via its home page for a variety of 
right-wing bands and their music and enables its customers to order immediately CD's or 
Cassettes by using a credit card. The customer can order on-line, by fax, or by mail. The 
Company also provides the web page visitor with the opportunity to actually listen to 
song samples of most bands and their music right away.  Other Companies are: 
Perkerwood Records, MSR, Tuono Records, et al. which also advertise via the World 
Wide Web. 
Web Page Sources: 
http://www.resistance.com/music.html 
http://www.resistance.com/tribute/index.html 
http://www.resistance.com/BFG.html 
http://www.resistance.com/NORTHUN.html 
http://www.resistance.com/RAHOWA.html 
http://www.resistance.com/ccards.html 
http://members.aol.com/tucosi/tuono.html 
http://www.cyberramp.net/shtdwn/ 
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/2588/ 